

This article was downloaded by: [TÜBİTAK EKUAL]

On: 15 December 2010

Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 772815468]

Publisher Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Turkish Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713636933>

A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges

Ahmet Sözen^a

^a Department of International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, North Cyprus

Online publication date: 10 May 2010

To cite this Article Sözen, Ahmet(2010) 'A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges', Turkish Studies, 11: 1, 103 – 123

To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14683841003747062

URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683841003747062>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf>

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges

AHMET SÖZEN

Department of International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, North Cyprus

ABSTRACT *This study sets out to explain the general characteristics of current Turkish foreign policy where it examines the interplay between important world events and emergent novel ideas at four different levels of analysis (conceptual setting, micro-setting, domestic macro-setting, and external macro-setting). The new Turkish foreign policy vision and its normative strategy, derived from Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth, have been blended with five new principles: balance between security and freedom; zero problems with neighbors; multi-dimensional and multi-track policies; a new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility; and rhythmic diplomacy.*

Introduction

Most students of international relations as well as practitioners of foreign policy-making acknowledge that the disciplines have been dominated by *realpolitik* since the times of Thucydides' *History of Peloponnesian War* (around 400 BC). While it is mostly the important world events which shape the ideas (and the theories) of International Relations (as a discipline) and international relations (as a practice), it is also true that novel ideas and theories do have an impact on the course of world events. It is against this background that one has to attempt to understand and explain the general characteristics of foreign policy-making of a particular country.

In order to understand and explain the general characteristics of current Turkish foreign policy this study will examine the interplay between important world events and emergent novel ideas at four different levels of analysis (conceptual setting, micro-setting, domestic macro-setting, and external macro setting), which are similar to the three levels of analysis in International Relations: the individual, state, and systemic levels.¹ The rationale behind this approach is found in the complexities of post-Cold War developments that have shaped Turkey's foreign policy orientation.

The end of the Cold War was a very important world event that had dramatic global effects, leaving almost no state unaffected. This development, which can be viewed as a paradigm shift on the systemic level, provided Turkey with new foreign policy opportunities along with many uncertainties that carry potential threats.

Correspondence Address: Ahmet Sözen, Department of International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, Gazimagusa, Mersin 10, Turkey. Email: ahmet.sozen@emu.edu.tr

Turkey spent the 1990s “muddling through” without a clear strategy in its foreign policy-making. However, when the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power in November 2002 it brought a clear vision, a new direction, a set of principles, and a new strategy for foreign policy. Scholars and Turkey-watchers use different terminologies to describe these changes of the AKP government. Some called this the rise of neo-Ottomanism, others called this the re-Islamization of Turkey, and yet others called this the Middle Easternization of Turkey.² Among these terms, neo-Ottomanism probably calls for a clear definition and elaboration, most of which will be carried out in the following pages.

Understanding Foreign Policy and its Making

In order to understand the basic characteristics of the foreign policy of a state, one needs to discover why and how certain foreign policy decisions are made. In that regard, the actual decision-maker and his/her environment play a very important role that needs to be taken into consideration in foreign policy-making. Unique cognitive characteristics of the individual decision-maker, his/her worldview (ideology), and the environment in which the decision-maker operates are but a few very important factors that need to be examined in order to understand a state’s foreign policy.

According to Rosenau,³ there are five sets of independent and explanatory variables in his pre-theory of foreign policy:

- 1) The individual factors: These include all aspects of the decision-maker, which make his/her behavior or policy choices different from that of other decision-makers.
- 2) The role factors: These are the external behaviors of the decision-makers (such as state or government officials), which are generated due to the roles that they play in their official positions.
- 3) The governmental factors: These are the factors related to the capacity and the capability of the government that influences the foreign policy choices of the decision-makers, either by improving or restraining the foreign policy choices of the decision-maker.
- 4) The societal factors: These are the factors related to society, such as the level of democracy and education, importance of religion in the society, culture, and so forth that affect the policy choices or behavior of the decision-maker.
- 5) The systemic factors: These are the external factors, important world developments—such as the end of the Cold War—that are by and large beyond the control of the decision-maker, but that nonetheless have important impacts on the policy choices or behavior of the decision-maker.

In this study, factors that influence foreign policy-making will be analyzed using a model that has four levels or settings (see Figure 1): (1) conceptual setting, (2) micro-setting, (3) domestic macro-setting, and (4) external macro-setting. This

model is inspired from two works. Firstly, it employs a similar logic to the famous three levels of analysis in international relations: the individual, state, and systemic levels.⁴ Secondly, this model attempts to build on the two-level (setting) model—micro-setting and macro-setting—that Yeşilada used in his evaluation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East.⁵

Conceptual setting refers to the theoretical/abstract source of ideas that are readily available for the decision-maker that he or she either consciously or unconsciously utilizes in making policy choices. Here, the amount of exposure of the decision-maker to a specific theoretical/conceptual setting or the amount of influence on and contact with the decision-maker that a particular theorist (or advisor) has is very important.

Micro-setting is the domain in which the human dimension of foreign policy-making comes into the picture. This setting can be broadly divided in two, as personality and role variables. The personality variable essentially entails social, educational, and religious background and the ideology of the decision-maker, as well as other relevant experiences that the decision-maker had. Features as such distinguish the behavior of a particular decision-maker from the behavior of the other decision-makers. Role variables are related to the external behavior of the decision-makers, which are generated due to the roles that they play in their official positions. The external behavior of the decision-maker, due to the role that he/she has to play, usually takes place in spite of the personal attributes that the decision-maker carries.

Macro-setting is divided into two variables: domestic (indigenous) and external (exogenous). Domestic macro-setting includes environmental and incidental factors, such as the level of democracy, institutionalization, and education in society—within the national boundaries of the country—that the decision-maker faces in his/her policy choices. External macro setting includes factors, such as significant world developments and/or important actions of world leaders—outside the national boundaries of the country—that influence the decision-maker in his/her policy choices. A simple model that unites the above-mentioned factors in the four settings (levels) is given in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Factors Affecting Foreign Policy Decisions.

Evaluation of the AKP's Foreign Policy

Conceptual Setting (Foundation)

This section introduces the conceptual setting that AKP's foreign policy-makers employ in agenda-setting. Two important sets of factors interact in shaping the policy orientation of decision-makers. The first set includes background characteristics of the individual. The second is the decision-makers theoretical and conceptual orientation. If the theorist is also the decision-maker (as in the case of Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu as foreign minister), it is imperative that the theorist's conceptual setting should be closely scrutinized in order to comprehend the conceptual background against which the policy choices are made.

Neo-Ottomanism

"Neo-Ottomanism" is in its origin a mid-nineteenth century movement that loosely gathered intellectuals from different branches of literature, journalism, arts, and politics, where the main drive of the members of the movement was to implement reforms in the Ottoman Empire through internal dynamics. In that regard, the advocates of this movement criticized the superficial and imitative (imported) modernization reforms of the *Tanzimat* (1839) era.⁶ The neo-Ottomans were liberals who held romanticist ideas of freedom. They advocated restrictions on the monarchy and the establishment of a parliament. One of the most famous neo-Ottomans was poet Namık Kemal, who experimented with the idea of synthesizing Islam and democracy. The role and the impact of the ideas of the neo-Ottomans on the Constitution declared in 1876 were quite enormous, and their influence can also be seen on the Young Turks movement that followed them.⁷

One of the leading authorities on this subject, Ali Fuat Borovalı, argues for re-investigating the "great multicultural empires" in the post-Cold War era, where "the notion of ethnicity, nation-state and the problem of multi-cultural co-existence increasingly hold centre stage on global agenda."⁸ According to Borovalı, the formulations of three influential columnists in the 1990s deserve closer attention in order to understand the emergence of the concept of "neo-Ottomanism" in more recent times.

Hadi Uluengin, of the daily *Hürriyet*, indicates that neo-Ottomanism does not mean the resurrection of the empire nor adopting an imperialist vision.⁹ For Uluengin, Turkey has more access to such areas as the Balkans in the post-Cold War era. These regions ironically happen to be the Ottoman Empire's former territories. For him, there is a need for Turkey to reconcile with its history (including Ottoman history). He maintains that while being aware of its virtues Turkey should also acknowledge its historical sins. Therefore, for Uluengin, neo-Ottomanism is almost like a psychotherapeutic process for Turkey to reestablish broken links between Ottoman legacy and the Republican era. Another columnist, Zülfü Livaneli in the daily *Sabah*, wrote an article entitled "Neo-Ottoman or Ottoman Hinterland?"¹⁰ He argued that Turkey should keep a distance from "neo-Ottomanism" since it can be

seen as ignoring “Turkishness”¹¹ and that the “Ottoman hinterland” should be seen only as a cultural aspect. In other words, for Livaneli the “Ottoman hinterland” is Turkey’s “natural cultural legacy” and that Turkey’s actions should be restricted to the cultural aspects, having no more than cultural solidarity similar to the one found among Hispanic countries. Finally, Cengiz Çandar in his article, “Turgut Özal: The Ottoman of the 21st Century,”¹² praised Özal for his policies and indicated the need for new approaches in breaking the deadlock in Turkish domestic and foreign policy domains. For Çandar, neo-Ottomanism is an exercise of understanding “how the Ottomans did it.” In that regard, neo-Ottomanism—adopting similar approaches to the Ottoman Empire—can help to maintain domestic stability and solve foreign policy problems. According to Çandar, “the thing that raises an empire is not military conquest but, as it was true about our Ottoman ancestors, the ability to absorb cosmopolitanism within its midst.”¹³

In contrast, Michael Rubin describes a profound shift in Turkish foreign policy during the AKP government in which, he suggests, “the AKP is enacting a policy of ‘neo-Ottomanism.’” For Rubin, “Turkey’s regional neighbors have a far different perception of Turkey than Turks have of themselves.”¹⁴ Some referred to neo-Ottomanism as “imperialistic”¹⁵ or even as a tool of the United States to “cripple” Orthodox Christianity and to “impose an Islamic ascendancy over parts of the Balkans.”¹⁶ Yet, for some Turkish columnists, neo-Ottomanism is part of the “Grand Middle East Project” of the United States, where, supposedly, the United States puts Istanbul as the capital of the Grand Middle East.¹⁷

Academics also debate neo-Ottomanism as ranging from the “(re)Islamization” and “Middle Easternization” of Turkish foreign policy to Turkey’s “rediscovery” of its old neighbors.¹⁸ Suat Kınıklıoğlu explains the rise of the neo-Ottomanism as an outcome of the Republic’s failure to satisfy the moral and ethical needs of contemporary Turkish society. According to Kınıklıoğlu, Turkey was unable to respond to a multitude of challenges such as globalization, especially the “global rise of identity politics and the concomitant ascent of religion.”¹⁹ Under these conditions, neo-Ottomanism gained momentum in many areas such as economics, literature, and the arts, and that foreign policy is not an exception in this new trend. Therefore, for Kınıklıoğlu, Turkey should not dissociate “itself from the past, but on the contrary, by embracing our rich and diverse Ottoman past and culture and marrying them with the positive and modernist gains of the republic.”²⁰ Kınıklıoğlu describes two current trends in the revival of Ottomanism among the Turkish elites:

First, it [the revival of Ottomanism] challenges the positivist-modernist republican narrative of Turkish history, which is based on a “rejection of heritage” [*red-i miras*] and thus traditionally distances itself from anything Ottoman. In this respect, Ottomanism reflects a certain amount of self confidence as its outlook is not merely national but regional and legitimizes Turkish outreach to a distinctly Ottoman geopolitical space. This sort of intellectual vein in foreign policy is most aptly represented by Ahmet Davutoğlu and his disciples. Second, it generates a significant amount of tension with the nationalist-paranoid

upsurge, which is extremely suspicious and feels threatened by the impact of globalization and Turkey's EU drive. This tension is most visible in the foreign policy field as well as on issues such as further democratization of Turkey. While the neo-Ottoman streak favors normalization with Arabs, Muslims and Kurds as Ottoman cosmopolitanism allows it to do, the other camp feverishly resists such a rapprochement and views it with stark skepticism.²¹

According to Sedat Laçiner, the director of the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), the AKP's policies show a departure from traditional Turkish foreign policy. Laçiner argued that the first Republican government of Turkey that followed the Ottoman Empire consciously turned its face away from the Middle East because of the belief that Middle East was "a place that was backward and tradition-bound."²² He further argues that

[Republican leaders] wanted to be Europeans and thus saw contact with the Middle East as basically dangerous for this project. Since the AKP came to power, however, Turkey has mended many of its fences with the Arabs and has realized it cannot turn its back on its history and geography.²³

In this regard, Turkey's foreign policy of rapprochement with Syria in the last several years is regarded as neo-Ottomanism in the Turkish media.²⁴

The critical question here is who and what is behind all these recent changes in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government. According to Richard Falk:

[Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's chief advisor for foreign policy Professor Ahmet] Davutoğlu represents a new cultural and political trend in Turkey associated with a deliberate revival of the Ottoman past, both as a matter of cultural enrichment, but also as a source of an enriched Turkish identity as a political actor. What Davutoğlu particularly celebrates is what he calls the "accommodative" character of the Ottoman Empire in its height, that is, the willingness to appreciate and respect civilizational and ethnic diversity, and to deal with political conflict in a spirit of compromise and reconciliation.²⁵

Although there is a lack of a common definition of neo-Ottomanism there is a common belief that there is a rise of something "Ottoman" and that the AKP is the main perpetrator of this trend.

The Davutoğlu Effect: Strategic Depth²⁶ and More

When Tayyip Erdoğan became prime minister in March 2003, the traditional small bureau of the chief advisor on foreign policy to the prime minister became an important center for the design of the new Turkish foreign policy, with Davutoglu at the helm. According to Alexander Murinson, Erdoğan elevated Davutoğlu's office "from the traditional small bureau, which provides day-to-day counsel to the prime

minister, to the source of strategic thinking and ideological support for the new foreign policy."²⁷ During the cabinet reshuffle in May 2009, Davutoğlu became the foreign minister of Turkey where this time he directly started employing his strategic depth concept, term that is also the title of his famous book on the subject.²⁸ According to Murinson:

The origins of this doctrine can be traced to Özal's neo-Ottomanism, "the multi-dimensional" foreign policy of the Erbakan government and Davutoğlu's innovative approach to geopolitics. The main thesis of this doctrine is that strategic depth is predicated on geographical depth and historical depth. Consequently, Turkey, as a result of its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses great geographical depth.... The "strategic depth" doctrine calls for an activist engagement with all regional systems in Turkey's neighborhood.²⁹

Davutoğlu maintains that when a country's ability to adapt to new conditions is evaluated, during and after times of instabilities, it is imperative to base the evaluation on a rational historical and geographical perspective.³⁰ Davutoğlu further argues that there was lack of strategic planning based on a healthy analysis of Turkey's historical and geographical potential in designing Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s. Davutoğlu further maintains that countries that are deeply affected by important world transformations, such as the end of the Cold War, are those countries which have historical and geographic depth. Davutoğlu describes a country with historical depth as:

[A] country that is always at the epicenter of events, whatever they may be.... Countries like Turkey, China, and Japan have deep historical roots in their regions.... During the transit from the 19th to the 20th century, there were eight multi-national empires across Eurasia: Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, China, Japan and Turkey. Now, these countries are experiencing very similar problems with their respective regions. Germany has experienced in Eastern Europe similar headaches to those felt by Turkey in the Balkans and the Middle East. As these countries possess historical depth they form spheres of influence; if they fail to do this they then experience various problems.³¹

For Davutoğlu, geographical depth of a country should be seen as a part of its historical depth. He further argues that:

Turkey is not just any old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic that distinguishes Turkey from say Romania or Greece is that Turkey is at the same time a Middle East and Caucasus country. Unlike Germany, Turkey is as much a European country as it is an Asian one. Indeed, Turkey is as much as a Black Sea country as it is a Mediterranean one. This geographical depth places Turkey right at the center of many geopolitical areas of influence.³²

Davutoğlu also brings civilization³³ into his historical-geographical dimension. Turkey's geography is set in a location that is halfway "from all the centers of civilization that have deeply influenced and shaped human history." Turkey's geography had close contact, as well as intensive interaction with Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, and the Mediterranean and Persian basins. For Davutoğlu, "this is a factor that will in all probability increase the contribution of Turkey."³⁴ In describing his historical-geographic dimension-based strategic depth analysis of Turkey in his book, Davutoğlu states:

When we now evaluate the whole of this picture, what we see in Turkey a country that not only faces many risks but has many great advantages too. At such a time there is a need to emphasize these advantages and one claim; but also to make a sound analysis of these advantages and this claim without resorting to patriotic, pie-in-the-sky rhetoric. That is what we have done here.³⁵

In this work, Davutoğlu proposes a normative strategy through his strategic depth concept where he recommends that Turkey should transform itself from being a wing state (of the Cold War) to becoming stronger as a center/pivotal state in the post-Cold War era. As a final goal, Davutoğlu suggests that Turkey has the potential to be (and should be) a global actor in the future. Once in the office of the chief advisor on foreign policy to the prime minister, Davutoğlu put forward five principles to guide Turkish foreign policy-making. These principles are:

1. Balance between freedom and security.
2. Zero problems with neighbors.
3. Multidimensional and multi-track policies.
4. A new diplomatic discourse based on firm flexibility.
5. Rhythmic diplomacy.³⁶

These principles will be analyzed in the external macro-setting below.

Micro-Setting

The AKP was established in 2001 by a group of young people who split from the Islamist Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), itself the successor of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), when the FP was closed down by court decision in 2001, following the same fate of all Islamist parties since the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) of the 1960s. They all came out of the National Outlook (Milli Görüş), an Islamist movement dating back to Necmettin Erbakan's National Order Party of the 1960s and the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) of the 1970s.³⁷ The split of the young opposition from RP and their establishment of the AKP was a departure from strict Islamist politics to moderation. The AKP was definitely playing for the center of the political spectrum. Claiming to be "conservative democrats" (and sometimes "Muslim democrats") similar to the European

Christian democrats—and not “Islamist” democrats—the AKP leadership promised democracy, more individual liberties and freedoms, market economy, and welfare for the poor, which brought the party to power with more than one-third of the Turkish vote in the November 2002 general elections.

If one looks at the AKP leadership more closely, one sees that Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has always been the first man in the party, followed by President Abdullah Gül, and then by state minister and former president of the Turkish parliament Bülent Arınç. Thus, for four years, from 2003 until 2007, the first man was the prime minister, the second man the foreign minister, and the third man the president of the parliament. The AKP top leadership has by and large operated in harmony. After the November 2007 general election, in which the AKP earned almost half the votes cast (47 percent), the first man remained prime minister, the second man became the president of the country, and the third man took a break but came back as a minister in a 2009 cabinet reshuffle. Tayyip Erdoğan decided to remain prime minister and send Abdullah Gül to the presidency after long debates and controversies.³⁸ During the second AKP government, following the 2007 election, the president of the parliament became Köksal Toptan, who replaced Bülent Arınç, the once-third-man of the party. Unlike others, Toptan did not have a Milli Görüş background, and he came directly from the center-right democrat convention.³⁹ This was a move by the AKP to signal that it is not “Islamist”—a tactic that the AKP sometimes uses in order to appease the concerns of the strictly secular Turks who believe that the AKP has a hidden agenda of turning Turkey into an “Islamic” state. Interestingly enough, Toptan was later replaced by a new candidate, Mehmet Ali Şahin, who is from a Milli Görüş background.

The AKP leadership had Islamist reflexes due to pressure from the party core. The headscarf issue and the controversy over adultery are two popular examples in that regard.⁴⁰ Once in the government, the AKP elite encountered the powerful institutions and norms of the state and had to conform to the roles prescribed by the positions they came to occupy. This included working with the powerful military that maintained a strong grip on Turkey’s foreign and security policies. For some observers, that meant integration of the AKP (which had Islamist roots) into the political system (which has traditionally been secular).⁴¹

However, when one looks at the foreign policy domain, one observes that the AKP leadership gave Davutoğlu the steering wheel to handle Turkish foreign policy. Except for a few incidents, such as Hamas leader Khalad Mashal’s visit to Turkey,⁴² the prime minister’s denunciation of Israel’s policies towards Palestinians,⁴³ and the invitation of the Sudanese prime minister to Turkey,⁴⁴ Davutoğlu’s policies have not significantly irritated the Turkish foreign policy establishment. Although Davutoğlu has been criticized by some for driving Turkey away from George W. Bush’s actions, the EU’s not-so-friendly policies towards Turkey in a way justified Davutoğlu’s attempt to bring Turkey closer to countries in other regions.

Gürkan Zengin, the news coordinator of CNN TURK, argues that since 2003 a “Davutoğlu effect” has been witnessed in Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, he

stresses the fact that an advisor with such influence on decision-making has hardly been witnessed before in Turkish diplomatic history.⁴⁵ This observation was also shared by *The Economist*. According to *The Economist*:

Even as it pursued the goal of European Union membership, [the] AKP started to revive long-dormant ties with the Muslim world. Driving this multi-pronged vision is Ahmet Davutoğlu, the self-effacing chief adviser on foreign policy to the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.... Both Mr. Erdoğan and Mr. Gül call him *Hodja*, or teacher.... Critics accuse Mr. Davutoğlu of pulling away from the West.... Sitting in his office in the Ottoman sultan's last palace, Dolmabahçe, Mr. Davutoğlu disagrees.... "Turkey can be European in Europe and eastern in the East, because we are both," he insists.⁴⁶

The article in *The Economist* concludes with the following: "Dealing with Turkish foreign policy means dealing with Mr. Davutoğlu"—even before Davutoğlu became the foreign minister.

Yet, Davutoğlu is classified as an "inadequate" neo-Ottoman by some observers. The term neo-Ottomanism has been used very loosely, and it lacks a clear definition. Even though Davutoğlu can be regarded as neo-Ottoman by some definitions, this is only part of the picture. Davutoğlu went a few steps farther and filled in neo-Ottomanism with his *Strategic Depth*. In this highly popular book he painstakingly analyzes the potential historical and geographic "depth" (or wealth) of Turkey and proposes a new paradigm shift for Turkish foreign policy. This shift will transform Turkey from being a "wing" country (*kanat ülke*) (of the Cold War) to being a "pivotal" state (*merkez ülke*) and finally a "global actor" in the post-Cold War era.

What is more important about AKP foreign policy-making today is that Davutoğlu's strategic depth has been operationalized with new supporting principles—the flesh and blood of strategic depth—which are becoming entrenched, as the examples below will illustrate.

Domestic Macro-Setting (Indigenous)

There were three important domestic factors that fostered the AKP's victory in the November 2002 general election. First was political instability. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey just "muddled through"⁴⁷ political instability and lack of a coherent foreign policy orientation. Second, the financial crises of November 2000 and February 2001 discredited traditional political parties in the eyes of the public. Third, Turkey's long fight against PKK terrorism was nowhere near an end and drained substantial energy and financial resources.

With such crises affecting popular discontent, the AKP won the 2002 election with a two-thirds majority in the parliament. At last, after eleven years of coalition governments, Turkey was once again ruled by a party government, that of the AKP. The new government came to power calling for more democratization and implementation of the economic reform program of the previous government without

much change. It also pushed forward reforms aimed at EU harmonization.⁴⁸ One important factor that has continued to provide an opportunity for the AKP to expand its power across state institutions has been the lack of an effective opposition. All major opposition parties, like the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), have failed to offer a clear alternative program for the Turkish electorate. Put simply, they have just criticized AKP policies without offering concrete alternatives.

External Macro-Setting (Exogenous)

The end of the Cold War has manifested two opposing global trends: fragmentation (disintegration) and integration. On the one hand, the EU (and to a lesser extent, such organizations as the North American Free Trade Agreement and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) had been widening and deepening their integration, while on the other hand such multi-ethnic countries as the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia had been disintegrating into dozens of nation-states. The two opposing global trends of the post-Cold War era created an ambivalent atmosphere of optimism and pessimism. With the end of the Cold War, the danger of a global nuclear war diminished and new opportunities to solve previously ignored domestic political and social problems arose. On the other hand, numerous ethnic conflicts emerged and presented serious challenges to regional peace across the world.

Yet norms of world politics were moving from *realpolitik*-based geopolitics to liberal-oriented geo-economics, and new norms and values, such as democracy, human rights, market economy, and environmental awareness and sustainability were clearly becoming globally popular and almost universally endorsed in the 1990s. It was in this area that Turkey was unable to successfully adapt its policies to new norms. Turkey mostly followed its Cold War conservative and narrow-visioned foreign policy during the 1990s. That policy was very much based on Turkey's geopolitically important geography, which was clearly not compatible with the emerging global norms and values of the 1990s.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union opened up new opportunities that had been previously closed for Turkey. During the first few years, Turkey set out to become the unofficial leader of the Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkish officials acted as a Big Brother to these newly independent states and caused serious displeasure among their Turkic cousins. However, the original excitement about these regions falling under the Turkish sphere of influence was proved unrealistic.⁴⁹ Later, Turkey's relations with this region came to be based on a more sober and realistic platform.

Another region that was closed to Turkey during the Cold War was the Balkans, which had been part of the Ottoman Empire. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry:

The Balkans as a region has played a significant role in European and world history. This strategically sensitive region is Turkey's gateway to continental

Europe. Important historical and cultural ties exist between the peoples of Turkey and the Balkan countries, which in effect mirror Turkey's close ties with the region.⁵⁰

Here, Turkey was modestly involved in the peacekeeping and nation-building activities.

Turkey's commitment to peacekeeping across the globe continues through her active participation in and support for various UN, NATO and EU led missions. These include, among others, such NATO operations as KFOR in Kosovo, Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean, the Military Training Mission for Iraq, as well as the EU led police missions in Macedonia (Proxima), Kinshasa (EUPOL) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), including the EUFOR-ALTHEA operation that replaced SFOR in the latter. With over 300 civilian police currently deployed in UN peacekeeping missions throughout the world, Turkey is among the Organization's leading contributors of civilian police.⁵¹

However, the capacity, attention, and the room for maneuver for Turkish foreign policy were heavily curtailed by three chronic domestic problems as mentioned above: economic crises, political instability, and terrorism.

After the AKP's successive reform packages, on October 6, 2004, the EU Commission in its annual *Regular Report on Turkey* indicated that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and recommended that the Council open accession negotiations with Turkey. After tough negotiations at the EU Council Summit on December 17, 2004, the Council decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005, and the actual negotiations indeed started; Turkey has now become an "acceding country" for EU membership. This is a historic decision of the EU in taking the first step towards the consensus of civilizations.⁵²

Once the AKP came to power, it started to capitalize on the new horizons opened for it in the post-Cold War era. In addition, the AKP foreign policy elite successfully grabbed the opportunity of the need for the consensus of civilizations idea after the re-popularity of the famous clash of civilizations hypothesis after September 11, 2001. Hence, Davutoğlu's strategic depth strategy, enriched by his five principles of foreign policy-making, was put into operation.

Balance Between "Freedom" and "Security"

When the Berlin Wall came down and the Cold War ended, freedom became the focal point of the dominant international discourse. However, since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, security issues have gained more importance and priority over many other issues. Security has occupied the focus of international discourse. Accordingly, in order to prevent terrorist activities similar to those of September 11, many countries started boosting their security arrangements, which automatically curtailed individual civil and political freedoms.

Turkey is truly an exceptional case in the post-September 11 era. Contrary to many countries, Turkey continued to increase the domain of individual freedoms after September 11 in accordance with its political reforms in order to satisfy the EU Copenhagen political criteria. On the one hand, Turkey has been continuing its armed struggle against the violent Kurdish separatist PKK attacks, while on the other hand, expanding the scope of individual freedoms by granting the Kurdish people of Turkey broadcasting and education rights in their mother tongue. Moreover, the AKP government seems to have established a balance between security and freedom. Prime Minister Erdoğan made it very clear that there would be “no stepping back from the Copenhagen criteria in the fight against terror.”⁵³ It is also striking that Turkey under the AKP government has gone so far as, besides the domestic reforms on expanding the domain of freedoms, openly advising Iran and Middle Eastern Arab countries to adopt democratic reforms.⁵⁴

“Zero Problems” with Neighbors

Turkey’s relations with her neighbors have been turbulent over the years, and it was not until recently that a coherent foreign policy strategy has been put into action by Ankara. Relations began to improve with Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia after the Cold War. As of 2009, Russian-Turkish relations are moving on a very positive platform, where the volume of foreign trade between the two countries has reached \$15 billion annually.

Relations with Syria and Greece started to improve towards the end of the 1990s. With respect to Greece, the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan marked the key turning point. Today, Greek-Turkish and Syrian-Turkish relations are by and large moving on a very positive platform. Relations with Iran have always been mostly balanced and on a realistic level. Relations with the former Soviet state of Georgia, since its independence, have always been extremely positive.

Turkey’s relations with Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s have been a bit ambivalent. During this period, Saddam Hussein played the Kurdish card pretty well against Turkey by sometimes secretly supporting and hosting the PKK and other times by openly attacking it. This was similar to his accustomed behavior, where he played one ethnic or religious group against the another domestically in order to maintain an absolute grip on Iraq. During the Saddam era, Iraq was not open to the Turkish government’s influence. However, the AKP government has already established constructive relations with the different religious and ethnic groups in Iraq, such as the Kurds, Turcomans, and the Sunnis. It is no secret that Turkey played an active role in motivating the Sunni groups to participate in the December 2005 election in Iraq, whereas they had previously boycotted the referendum on the new Iraqi constitution. This also shows another fundamental Turkish foreign policy principle at work, wherein Turkey used multidimensional and multi-track policies. In parallel to keeping several religious and ethnic groups engaged, the AKP engages both the Iraqi government and the US occupying force in Iraq. The AKP government is encouraging Turkish corporations to enter the Iraqi market as well as the region

under the Kurdish Regional Government. These businesses include those owned by the powerful Turkish military's pension fund (OYAK). In that way, some sort of an economic (inter-)dependence is established between Turkey and the region.

There are two exceptions to Turkey's positive relations with its neighbors: Cyprus and Armenia. Turkey's relations with the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus since 1963 have not been normalized. Although Turkey actively supported the UN-sponsored Cyprus peace plan (known as the Annan Plan) that called for the unification of the island in the 2004 referenda, the Greek Cypriot side refused the plan by a margin of 76 percent and prevented the normalization of the relations between Turkey and a united Cyprus. Turkey, however, still supports the UN-sponsored peace negotiations that started in April 2008 on the island. Turkey's relations with Armenia deteriorated when Armenia occupied Nagorno-Karabakh (in Azerbaijan) in the early 1990s. Although Turkey was among the first countries that recognized Armenian independence in 1991, Turkey closed its border to Armenia and suspended its diplomatic relations. However, there are signs, such as the famous "football diplomacy" when President Abdullah Gül accepted the Armenian president's invitation to watch the Armenian-Turkish national football teams match in Armenia in September 2008, as well as the October 10, 2009 protocol between the two countries, that the two sides want to normalize the relations. However, as the crisis⁵⁵ before the signing ceremony of the protocol showed, normalization of the relations will be quite problematic.

"Multidimensional" and "Multi-Track Policies"

During the Cold War era, when static polarization was the main characteristic of the international system, Turkey by and large followed a typical mono-dimensional and mono-track foreign policy that was shaped by NATO's security preferences. The main focus of Turkish foreign policy was security (mono-dimensional), which was conducted by the state (mono-track). However, the end of the Cold War expanded Turkish foreign policy horizons. The playing field of maneuver for Turkish foreign policy—in terms of geography, number of issues, and tools—has dramatically expanded.

During the post-Cold War era where the international system became more dynamic and issue-wise more diversified, Turkey started to put more emphasis on economic and cultural relations in addition to security. Turkey's trade volume has increased dramatically with the EU, the United States, and the Middle East. In addition, with the opening of new playing fields for Turkey in the post-Cold War era, Turkey has entered into intensive economic and cultural relations with the newly independent states of Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Hence, Turkish foreign policy had to diversify and become multidimensional.

The traditional mono (or first)-track Turkish foreign policy became quite obsolete in fully exploiting the potential of the opportunities and furthering Turkey's national interests in the post-Cold War era. In that sense, Turkish foreign policy started to benefit from the involvement of powerful Turkish individuals and NGOs in foreign

affairs. For example, such powerful NGOs like TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), İKV (Economic Development Foundation), and TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) played a very constructive role in lobbying to start Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU. Many big businesses, such as Koç and Anadolu, opened factories in the former Soviet states. Corporations like ENKA and Alarko are involved in enormous construction projects in former Soviet states. Turkish universities also expanded their cooperation agreements and joint projects with universities in the EU and former Soviet states. Turkish academics, prominent writers, artists, and NGO leaders are now participating in numerous international projects, conferences, and seminars. In other words, they have become private "ambassadors" of Turkey in this new era. Their work on different tracks can be termed as complimentary to first-track foreign policy.

A New Diplomatic Discourse Based on Firm Flexibility

The developments discussed in the previous sections signaled a dramatic new strategy in Turkey's foreign policy-making and implementation in recent years. As the war against the PKK eased, relations with the EU improved, and Turkey expanded its international socioeconomic relations, Turkish foreign policy started to take on a less hardened and rigid focus that characterized the Cold war era. For example, during the AKP government, Turkey silently stopped using *casus belli* and projected the idea of bilateral dialogue and even international arbitration in solving the problems in the Aegean with Greece. This was a significant shift from Turkey's traditional foreign policy towards Greece.

Perhaps the best example of the changing foreign policy discourse of Turkey is in the case of Cyprus. The AKP came to power with an election promise that "no solution is the solution in Cyprus" and "status quo in Cyprus is the solution" policies would not be acceptable. Instead, the AKP promised to solve the Cyprus problem by following a less confrontational strategy. In that regard, the AKP suggested that the Belgian model should be seriously considered for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Moreover, Prime Minister Erdoğan repeatedly stated that Turkey's Cyprus policy was based on a "win-win" strategy. During negotiations in New York in early 2004 and until the Cyprus referenda in May later that year, Erdoğan even went so far as saying that the "Turkish side will always be one step ahead" in the Cyprus negotiations, signaling the new Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus. This was a clear sign of a new principle in Turkish foreign policy, named as firm flexibility by Davutoğlu. Firm flexibility means "knowing what you want and being *firm* on this issue, yet being as *flexible* as possible in demanding and negotiating on this with the other side" (author's emphasis).⁵⁶

Turkey's response to the crisis that resulted from the publication of a series of cartoons by a Danish newspaper that portrayed Muhammad in an offensive manner could also be considered an example of this change. There were many demonstrations against this event in Muslim countries that ended in violence and casualties.

However, the Turkish government approached the issue with calm and called for moderation. As the co-chairs of the UN-initiated Alliance of Civilizations, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Zapatero made a joint declaration to the world on the cartoon crisis and called for calm.⁵⁷

Rhythmic Diplomacy

Another crucial dimension of the AKP's foreign policy paradigm is rhythmic diplomacy. Davutoğlu argues that:

if the conditions are dynamic and one stands static, then one cannot adapt to the conditions. One needs to have a constantly moving diplomacy. That's why I call it rhythmic. In other words, even if nothing happens, one has to be active when standing.⁵⁸

As a consequence of Davutoğlu's advice, the AKP government engaged in high volume diplomatic visits in which Turkish officials engaged in dialogue with their foreign counterparts all around the globe while at the same time invited foreign dignitaries to come to Turkey for consultations.

Davutoğlu stated:

[In 2003], despite all the crises management [the Iraq War and Cyprus negotiations] and the domestic economic crisis and other challenges, the foreign minister and other ministers visited more than 60 countries. The prime minister and the foreign minister visited more than 40 countries.... [During 2003] nine presidents, 14 prime ministers, and 25 foreign ministers came to Turkey for official visits.⁵⁹

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey spent 2003 on crises management, when the newly established AKP government found two hot issues on its plate. One such issue was the US decision to invade Iraq and how American officials wanted to involve Turkey in their designs in the invasion. The other issue was none other than the Cyprus problem. While initial interaction with the United States over Iraq ended in a less than satisfactory outcome for Turkey, the same cannot be said about policies followed in Cyprus.

In Cyprus, the AKP focused on three domains in 2004. First, the Cyprus issue was on the top of the agenda during the first four months of the year, until the Cyprus referenda in April. Second, Turkey put its main focus on the EU process until December 17, when the EU decided to open the accession negotiations with Turkey. Third, the Foreign Ministry continued to follow Davutoğlu's "zero-problems with neighbors" principle when the prime minister and the foreign minister paid official visits to Turkey's immediate neighbors, Greece, Bulgaria, Iran, and Syria.

In 2005, the prime minister and foreign minister visited countries on Turkey's periphery, such as Russia, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Albania, Serbia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Towards the end of 2005, in order to further open Turkish foreign policy, the prime minister visited a series of countries from East Asia to Africa that included New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Ethiopia. Most of these were the first official Turkish high-level visits. In 2006, the Foreign Ministry made a new opening towards Africa and Latin America, especially for the purpose of seeking support for Turkey's membership to the UN Security Council for 2009; Turkey eventually became a temporary member of the Council with the support of 151 member states.

In 2007, though it was a year of general elections, diplomatic traffic to and from Turkey continued with several important developments. Turkey brought the president of Israel, Shimon Peres, and the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, together, where they both gave speeches in parliament. Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis of Greece was the first Greek prime minister to visit Turkey in 49 years. President Abdullah Gül was the first Turkish president who was invited by and gave a speech at Council of Europe. Similar diplomatic traffic continued in 2008 and 2009.

Conclusion: Transition and Challenges

It was against a tough domestic background, as well as challenging international systemic changes, that Turkey began to design and implement its new foreign policy orientation in the 1990s during the late Özal era. During the same period, Turkey had to struggle with high inflation and severe economic crises.⁶⁰ It was almost impossible to design and apply a rational structural economic program, let alone design a concrete foreign policy strategy in an environment where there was political instability due to several different coalition governments.⁶¹ Moreover, Turkey was fighting against the PKK during the 1990s. The war against the PKK not only drained Turkey's attention and energy but also cost Turkey billions of dollars.⁶² In addition, Turkey lacked a clear new vision and a strategy to cope with the end of the Cold War, which necessitated changes in the traditional foreign policy-making.

Starting with the 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey was declared a "candidate country," more changes in traditional Turkish foreign policy behavior have been observed. The changes in the Turkish foreign policy have been more visible and pronounced especially since the November 2002 election that brought the AKP to government.

When the AKP came to power, it successfully capitalized on the neo-Ottomanist movement of the early post-Cold War Özal era. The AKP successfully exploited the political stability of being a one-party government and the fruits of the economic program (originally designed by Kemal Derviş). Furthermore, the AKP combined all these with a concrete foreign policy vision and a normative strategy (of eventually transforming from a pivotal country into a global actor) that Davutoğlu designed in the post-Cold War era, in which new horizons were opened for Turkey. As the examples in the analysis above demonstrate, the AKP has been following a

new set of principles in Turkey's foreign policy choices, which are becoming entrenched.

On two occasions—first the invitation of the Hamas leader Khalad Mashal and later the invitation of Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese leader who is indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal, to Turkey—AKP foreign policy received a lot of criticism in the media. It was argued that such cases are examples of contradictions with usual Turkish foreign policy. In a way, such cases demonstrate the moments of a clean break of the current AKP's foreign policy from the traditional one that focused on the Western Alliance's priorities and a new orientation that brings Turkey closer to the Islamic world. In the first instance, Turkey's intention to help integrate Hamas into the peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is quite understandable, especially taking into the consideration that Hamas won the election in the Palestinian territories, gaining it legitimacy. This can be seen as a part of Turkey's conducting a multidimensional and multitrack policy. So, in a way, Turkey as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict wanted to introduce a popular and a legitimate actor into the nonviolent peace process. In addition to domestic secular opposition to the AKP on this matter, such a move by Turkey surely received a lot of criticism from the United States and Israel, who are Turkey's traditional allies. It is believed that Turkey's relations with these two valuable allies suffered because of Turkey's invitation to Hamas. The October 2009 AKP decision to cancel the international section of the military exercise Anatolian Eagle is perceived as a blatant act aimed at Israel. Instead of simply excluding Israel from the training missions where Israeli pilots participate, the AKP government chose a less controversial option and cancelled it all together. It is also important to note that close military and defense ties between Israel and Turkey were forged by General (ret.) Cevik Bir, who is viewed by AKP's Islamist members as the nemesis of the former Welfare Party and epitomized the anti-Islamist orientation of the old political elite.

The invitation of Sudanese leader al-Bashir was problematic and not compatible with either the traditional or the current Turkish foreign policy principles. It was obvious that Turkey was after getting Sudan's support for the former's UN Security Council membership. However, this move, although rational and understandable from a very realist perspective, was too costly on the prestige of Turkey as a democracy.

It is clear, however, that the new Turkish foreign policy vision and its normative strategy—together with the five principles—have certain limitations, though it is beyond the focus of this study to fully evaluate its global implications. It would suffice to say that AKP's Islamist reflexes in domestic politics and Turkey's relative lack of financial resources are the potential factors that can limit the success of the new Turkish foreign policy vision and strategy in the future.

Notes

1. David J. Singer, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations," in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 20–29.

2. For an excellent account on the original movement of neo-Ottomanism, see Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu* [The Birth of the Idea of the New Ottoman] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007) and Michael Rubin, "Shifting Sides? The Problem of neo-Ottomanism" (2004), <http://meforum.org/article/628> (accessed January 20, 2008). In addition, see Tarik Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?" *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2008).
3. James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (London: Francis Pinter, 1980).
4. David Singer, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations", pp. 20–29.
5. Birol A. Yeşilada, "Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East," in A. Eralp, M. Tünay and B. Yeşilada (eds.), *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp. 169–192.
6. Tanzimat means "reorganization." It indicates a series of reforms in the Ottoman Empire from 1839 to 1876 under the rule of the sultans Abdülmecid I and Abdülaziz. These reforms were intended to transform the empire, which was based on theocratic principles, to a European-style modern state.
7. For more details, see Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007).
8. Ali Fuat Borovali, "Post-Modernity, Multiculturalism and Ex-Imperial Hinterland: Habsburg and Ottoman Legacies Revisited," in *Perceptions*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1997-February 1998).
9. Ibid.
10. Zülfü Livaneli, "Neo-Ottoman or Ottoman Hinterland?" *Sabah* (June 16, 1992).
11. See Zülfü Livaneli, "Rainbow Identity," *Sabah* (July 20, 1994).
12. Cengiz Çandar, "Turgut Özal: The Ottoman of the 21st Century," *Sabah* (April 28, 1992).
13. Ibid.
14. Rubin, "Shifting Sides?"
15. Stephanos Constantinides, "Turkey: The Emergence of a New Foreign Policy the Neo-Ottoman Imperial Model," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Winter 1996), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3719/is_199601/ai_n8750313/print (accessed September 15, 2009).
16. Joseph E. Fallon, "The Neo-Ottoman Empire," *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture* (April 2006), <http://islamfund.blogspot.com/2007/12/neo-ottoman-empire.html> (accessed September 15, 2009).
17. Güler Kömürcü, "Derviş'li AKP ve Yeni Osmanlı Birliği Planı," [The AKP and the New Ottoman Unity Plan with Derviş] *Akşam* (July 20, 2004); Yaman Törüner, "Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi," [The Grand Middle East Project] *Milliyet* (February 26, 2004).
18. See Tarik Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?" in *Turkish Studies* Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), pp. 3–20; N. Raptopoulos, "Rediscovering its Arab Neighbors? The AKP Imprint on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *Les Cahiers du RMES* (2004); G. Çavdar, "Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 121, No. 3 (2006), pp. 477–497.
19. Kınıklıoğlu, "The Return of Ottomanism," *Today's Zaman* (March 20, 2007), <http://www.todayzaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=105869> (accessed September 20, 2008).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Sedat Laçiner, "Küresel Bakış," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly* (July 19, 2008), <http://www.turkish-weekly.net/turkce/yazarlar.php?type=3&id=366> (accessed November 15, 2008).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Richard Falk, "Reconsidering Turkey," *Zaman* (October 6, 2004).
26. Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* [Strategic Depth: The International Position of Turkey] (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).
27. Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2006), p. 947.
28. Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*.

29. Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy", p. 947.
30. Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Turkish Daily News* (June 14, 2001).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. For Ahmet Davutoğlu's in-depth analysis on the civilization aspect in world politics, see A. Davutoğlu, "The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order," *Perceptions*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1997-February 1998) and A. Davutoğlu, "It's Only Natural," *Al-Ahram Weekly* (December 13-19, 2001).
34. Ahmet Davutoğlu, "The Power Turkey Does Not Use is that of Strategic Depth," *Turkish Daily News* (June 14, 2001).
35. Ibid.
36. For more details, see Ahmet Sözen, "Changing Fundamental Principles in Turkish Foreign Policy Making". Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, March 22-25, 2006.
37. For a detailed study on the religious parties in Turkey, see Birol A. Yeşilada, "The Virtue Party," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 62-81.
38. For Gül's presidency debate, see "Generals' Warning May Prove Positive," *Guardian*, May 1, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/01/simontisdall.international> (accessed November 20, 2008).
39. In 2009, Köksal Toptan was replaced as the president of the parliament by Mehmet Ali Şahin, a moderate AKP MP and former state minister who comes from the National Outlook tradition and is very close to the prime minister.
40. For the new penal law adultery issue, see "Turkey Revises its Penal Code in Bid to Join the European Union," *New York Times*, (September 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/27/international/europe/27turkey.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&position=&oref=slogin (accessed November 20, 2008).
41. See Abbas Güçlü, "AKP de system partisi oldu," [AKP, too, Became a System Party] *Milliyet* (June 30, 2007), <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/06/30/yazar/guclu.html> (accessed November 20, 2008).
42. See " Hamas Visit: Good Diplomacy by Ankara," *Zaman*, (February 21, 2006), <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=30119> (accessed November 20, 2008).
43. See "Erdoğan Angered by Israel's Gaza Campaign," *Today's Zaman*, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=162602> (accessed January 14, 2010).
44. See "Un-understandable Logic behind the Visit," *Turkish Daily News*, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=un-understandable-logic-behind-the-visit-2008-01-28> (accessed January 14, 2010).
45. Gürkan Zengin, "Davutoğlu Kitabını Hayata Geçiriyor," [Davutoğlu Puts His Book into Practice] *Star Gazetesi* (January 21, 2008).
46. "Turkey's Foreign Policy: An Eminence Grise," *The Economist*, (November 15, 2007), http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10146653 (accessed November 20, 2008).
47. See Stephan F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), p. 16.
48. Ahmet Sözen, "Turkish Democratization in Light of its EU Candidate Status," in K. Inglis and A. Ott (eds.), *The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Union in Diversity?* (Amsterdam: Europa Law Publishing), pp. 300-304.
49. There were several reasons for Turkey's limited success in expanding its influence in Central Asia in the 1990s. Turkey did not have the necessary financial means and resources to take an important economic and political role in the region. The "Turkish model," based on democracy, secularism, and market economy, had little attraction from the autocratic leaders of the region. Turkey's domestic problems limited the amount of attention and resources Turkey could devote to the region. In addition, Russian influence in the region was stronger than had been anticipated in Turkey. For further details, see William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000* (London, Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 191-212.

50. See "Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy," at the Turkish Foreign Ministry web site, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Synopsis/SYNOPSIS.htm> (accessed November 20, 2008).
51. *Ibid.*
52. Sözen, "Turkish Democratization in Light of its EU Candidate Status."
53. Ekrem Dumanlı, "Erdogan: No Stepping Back from the Copenhagen Criteria in the Fight Against Terror," *Today's Zaman* (September 14, 2005), <http://www.zaman.com/?bl=international&alt=&trh=20050914&hn=24050> (accessed November 20, 2008).
54. Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer called for democracy and reform in Muslim countries during the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in June 2004, where the foreign ministers came together in Istanbul in June 2004.
55. On October 10, 2009, Turkey and Armenia signed two important protocols to normalize their relationship after a crisis over the speeches of the two foreign ministers, which lasted several hours and was defused by the intervention of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
56. Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*.
57. Tarık Ramadan, "Free Speech and Civic Responsibility: Cartoon Controversy 2," *International Herald Tribune* (February 5, 2006), <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/05/opinion/edramadan.php> (accessed November 20, 2008).
58. Gürken Zengin, *CNN Turk Special Editorial* (February 17, 2004).
59. *Ibid.*
60. For further details, see Ziya Öniş, "The Turkish Economy at the Turn of a New Century: Critical and Comparative Perspectives," in M. Abromowitz (ed.), *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000), pp. 95–115.
61. For further details, see Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 195–199.
62. For further details, see Svante E. Cornell, "The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics," in M. S. Radu (ed.), *Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey's Foreign Relations* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 123–142 and M. S. Radu, "The Rise and Fall of the PKK," in M. S. Radu (ed.), *Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey's Foreign Relations* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 143–164.